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Abstract
This paper has three principal aims. It firstly provides some theoretical background on
the key current research issues and challenges in regard to industrial relations in multi-
national companies. It then presents a concise review of scholarship to date on indus-
trial relations in multinational companies using INTREPID (Investigation of Transnationals’
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Employment Practices: an International Database) data. Finally, the paper identifies some of
the main industrial relations issues that remain to be addressed, in effect charting a form
of research agenda for future work using the INTREPID data, with particular focus on
the potential contribution from ‘late joiners’ to the INTREPID project.
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Introduction
The objectives of this paper are threefold. We initially review some of the key
current debates regarding industrial relations in multinational companies
(MNCs). We then consider the contribution of the so-called INTREPID
(Investigation of Transnationals’ Employment Practices: an International
Database1) study to these debates. INTREPID comprises a network of inter-
national scholars involved in coordinated surveys of employment practice in
MNCs in diﬀerent national contexts with the objective of providing an accurate
and representative picture of employment practices in MNCs. The paper concludes
by identifying a number of industrial relations issues that remain to be addressed or
further investigated, thus charting a research agenda for future work using the
INTREPID database with particular focus on the potential contribution from
‘second wave’ countries, namely, Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Mexico and the
Nordic area (Denmark and Norway).
Industrial relations in MNCs
Aside from a conviction that home and host-country factors inﬂuence management
practice in industrial relations withinMNC subsidiaries, recent literature – including
some work based on the INTREPID project – identiﬁes the inﬂuence of organisa-
tional and structural characteristics of MNCs themselves in impacting on manage-
ment practice, including that aﬀecting industrial relations. This reinforces the need to
look beyond macro-institutional eﬀects alone and include micro-organisational and
MNCcharacteristics to develop an in-depth and comprehensive understanding of the
factors impacting on industrial relations practice and subsidiary level autonomy over
industrial relations within MNCs. Furthermore, although qualitative research has
been developed around management approaches to industrial relations on the one
hand, and employee representatives’ perception of those practices on the other (cf.
Almond and Ferner, 2006; Marginson et al., 2004; Waddington, 2010), in-depth
quantitative analysis of factors shaping variation across subsidiary level is, to date,
quite limited. The INTREPID database oﬀers a unique opportunity to address these
aspects. By drawing on an extensive international database, compiled from parallel
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surveys of employment practice in the operations of MNCs in 10 countries, it oﬀers
the basis for a robust analysis and understanding of industrial relations and its deter-
minants within MNC subsidiaries across borders.
Two contrasting logics characterise much of the extant literature on MNCs and
industrial relations. On the one hand, a long research tradition suggests that trade
unions, employee representation structures and conventions are deeply embedded in
national political economies, and that their institutions are so powerful that MNCs
are forced to adapt to local traditions (e.g. collective bargaining, interaction with
works councils) despite corporate preference to act otherwise for reasons related to
perceived competitive advantage (Taylor et al., 1996; Whitley, 2001). On the other
hand, the countervailing logic is thatMNCs operate in amanner which is ‘exogenous
to national path dependencies’ (Lamare et al., 2013: 695) and seek to deploy practices
developed in diﬀerent national contexts and/or utilise approaches which dilute the
impact of local institutional pressures. Some empirical studies have shown how US
MNCs in coordinated market economies (CMEs) manage to substantially insulate
themselves from the inﬂuence of trade unions and sectoral bargaining (e.g. Royle,
1998, 2000). This suggests that MNCs are increasingly seeking to adapt bargaining
processes and structures to their own needs and to consider national and sectoral
collective bargaining as less relevant to their own employment practices.
Furthermore, they may increasingly compare themselves with other subsidiaries of
their own company in other countries or in – domestic or foreign – competitors
(Arrowsmith and Marginson, 2006). One possible scenario is that in countries with
multi-employer bargaining traditions and strong trade unions, MNCs will push for
greater decentralisation of collective bargaining and the concomitant freedom to
negotiate their own employment practices with local unions, independently of
national and sectoral dynamics, and to focus on the strengthening of their own
competitiveness and adaptability (Marginson and Meardi, 2009).
Drawing from these various studies, which clearly illustrate some degree of
autonomy in the way local (host country) management in MNC subsidiaries
engage with local unions and their systems of collective representation, this
paper highlights the need for additional empirical investigation of the factors
inﬂuencing local management discretion over employee representation and engage-
ment. Of particular interest is the interaction between macro-institutional (e.g.
country-of-origin eﬀects, host-country characteristics) and organisational and
structural ﬁrm-level factors (e.g. international human resource management
(HRM) structure, management organisation, ownership and demographic factors).
Speciﬁcally, we are interested in understanding how these two groups of features
inﬂuence patterns of employee representation and the extent and form of engage-
ment by local management in industrial relations in MNC subsidiaries.
Much of extant literature on industrial relations in MNCs has focused on
employee voice (cf. Boxall and Purcell, 2003). Lavelle et al. (2010: 396) deﬁne
employee voice as ‘any type of mechanisms, structure or practice, which provides
an employee with an opportunity to express an opinion or participate in decision-
making within their organization’. Employee voice is usually operationalised into
Gunnigle et al. 3
 at University of Limerick on February 18, 2015jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
XML Template (2015) [16.2.2015–12:43pm] [1–20]
//blrnas3.glyph.com/cenpro/ApplicationFiles/Journals/SAGE/3B2/JIRJ/Vol00000/140032/APPFile/SG-
JIRJ140032.3d (JIR) [PREPRINTER stage]
two broad categories, namely, direct voice and indirect voice. Direct voice is
described as any communication mechanism acting as a vehicle for employees to
improve their direct involvement in management decision making. This classiﬁca-
tion refers mainly to participation, consultation and information sharing. Indirect
voice encompasses any mechanisms that provide employees with the channel for
expressing their views via ‘some form of collective employee representation such as
trade unions or non-union structures of collective representation (e.g. via consulta-
tive committees or work councils)’ (Lavelle et al., 2010: 396). Since Freeman and
Medoﬀ (1984) proﬁled trade unions as key actors in the sphere of employee voice,
we ﬁnd a lack of consensus on this theme. Important manifestations of a shift in
focus from trade unions and collective bargaining to other forms of employee voice
include the progressive decline in trade union density in countries with strong trade
union traditions and increased union avoidance, often based on the principles of
the welfare capitalism as developed in the US and often practised by US MNCs
abroad (Jacoby, 1997). Crucial questions remain as to the relative inﬂuence of
macro- and micro-level eﬀects on approaches to employee voice in MNC subsidi-
aries abroad.
Institutionalism and MNCs
Our starting point in investigating industrial relations within MNCs is a compara-
tive institutionalism perspective which acknowledges that competitiveness in the
international economic system is compatible with a wide range of national-institu-
tional arrangements. Speciﬁcally, industrial and employment studies have centred
on two contrasting propositions while examining the inﬂuence MNCs possess in
shaping employment practices. Scholars drawing from the salience of diﬀerent
‘national business systems’ (Whitley, 1999) point to strong national eﬀects on
local employment policies and practices in MNCs. This thereby leads to systemic
diﬀerences in the way national business systems organise their economic activity
through the mechanisms governing the operation of capital, labour and product
markets and their subsequent impact on MNCs’ behaviour (Ferner et al., 2005).
Thus, the primary assumption of the institutionalist approach is that MNCs will be
inﬂuenced in their international operations by the structures, operating models,
and patterns of thoughts and behaviour they have developed in response to the
business context in which they originate (Whitley, 2001). Speciﬁcally, it is claimed
that country of origin eﬀects inﬂuence MNCs’ attitudes and approaches to unions
and collective employee representation (Ferner and Quintanilla, 2008).
Accordingly, for example, German-owned multinationals tend to exhibit strong
ﬁrm-based indirect representative forms of employee voice, contrasting with US-
owned MNCs which appear to prefer direct engagement with employees (Ferner
and Varul, 1999). Speciﬁcally, studies of MNCs in Ireland suggest that many US
MNCs engage in union avoidance in order to avoid having to take part in collective
bargaining, among other reasons (Gunnigle, 1995; Gunnigle et al., 2005).
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Nevertheless, some literature has noted that globalisation processes do not have
simple homogenising eﬀects: rather, they are reshaped, resisted and redeployed by
the socially embedded processes of the host location, emphasising country of
operation-level distinctiveness (Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998). More speciﬁcally,
it is argued that country of operation eﬀects inﬂuence the application of MNCs’
employment policies and practices on the ground (Almond et al., 2005). In par-
ticular, these studies show that even when MNCs apply ‘best’ employment prac-
tices globally, local adaptation of these practices remains necessary. Since employee
representation systems are deeply embedded in national institutional arrangements,
it would be diﬃcult for foreign MNCs to simply transfer home-country approaches
into diﬀerent national contexts. Rather, as some researchers argue, it seems more
plausible that MNC subsidiaries adapt their practices to accommodate local con-
text, including national legislation concerning collective bargaining, employee rep-
resentation structures and social rights of information and consultation (Whitley,
2001). This work frequently draws a contrast between CMEs, which have higher
levels of regulation and institutionalisation of employee representation structures
and practices, and liberal market economies (LMEs), characterised by lower levels
of regulation regarding employee representation and works councils’ rights. The
argument is that the range of employment practices open to ﬁrms is more con-
trolled, and therefore restricted, in subsidiaries operating within CMEs than in
LMEs.
Beyond national institutionalism
Home and host-country claims alone are insuﬃcient to explain the development of
industrial relations practices within MNCs, not least because of two main reasons
reported in the literature. First, it is argued that, depending on the ‘economic
success’ of the country of origin, MNCs from more ‘successful’ countries can
more easily transfer their domestic management practices abroad (Royle, 2006).
This ‘economic dominance’ eﬀect may be particularly relevant for national econo-
mies which are highly reliant on foreign investment (Geary and Roche, 2001,
Gunnigle et al., 2009). Second, a primary concern of contemporary institutional
accounts concerns isomorphism or hybridisation at country level. Also known as
‘dual institutional eﬀect’, this concerns the ways in which MNCs strategically adapt
their practices to take advantage of institutional distance and abandon practices
prevalent in their home countries. There is evidence, for example, of German
MNCs opting to operate in environments where they are not subjected to code-
termination and works councils (Meardi et al., 2009). On the other hand, MNCs
from LMEs may more easily view their home practices as a source of competitive
advantage and attempt to transfer these to host countries (Lamare et al., 2013).
Thereby, the ‘dual institutional eﬀect’ approach reﬂects the formal regulatory
structures and the manner in which the socialisation process is framed by
nation-speciﬁc formal and informal patterns of behaviour.
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From a comparative institutional perspective, social actors within MNCs are
seen as operating between the competing institutional forces exerted by MNC head
oﬃce at home (parent company) as it attempts to transfer policy to the subsidiary,
and those forces exerted by the host institutional context within which the MNC
operates. In addition, Whitley (1999) argues that ﬁrms within diﬀerent host insti-
tutional contexts may demonstrate diﬀerent ways of dealing with employment and
industrial relations institutional structures, such as systems of employee represen-
tation and collective bargaining, which often go beyond the traditional institu-
tional contrast between CMEs and LMEs. More speciﬁcally, MNCs’ industrial
relations practices may be inﬂuenced by the extent of organisational leeway
enjoyed by local actors at subsidiary level. Hence, within the context of the
home and host institutional factors, MNCs at local level develop their own strat-
egy, using their discretion to pursue speciﬁc interests and locally negotiating in that
respect. For example, Meardi et al. (2009) found that country of origin and coun-
try of operation eﬀects partly explained the transfer of employment practices in US
and German multinationals’ subsidiaries in Central and Eastern European coun-
tries because of the ‘contested’ and ‘contingent’ nature of the process of transfer
within MNCs. This is the case for diﬀerent reasons. First of all, MNCs have to
negotiate with powerful actors in the local environment, such as the unions and
their existing structures of employee representation. Second, actors at diﬀerent
organisational levels may have diﬀerent interests as well as diﬀerent resources.
From a power and interest perspective, the mechanisms through which local man-
agers attempt to exercise their autonomy at the subsidiary level can be diverse and
reﬂect their organisational interests and local power resources (Ferner et al., 2013).
Sometimes local management can negotiate a path through various, sometimes
contradictory, institutional pressures from the home and host environments.
Power resources may derive from a subsidiary’s success and consequent credibility
within the wider ﬁrm and from the local actors’ ability to exploit the local insti-
tutional context. By acting as interpreters of the possibilities and limits of the local
institutional environment, subsidiary actors may lever considerable freedom of
action for themselves in the face of institutional pressures from headquarters
and from the institutional forces of the parent-country business system (Ferner
et al., 2005). Williams and Geppert (2011) report that German management used
the argument that works councils would not agree to certain measures in order to
resist decisions made at corporate level while preserving their autonomy and enga-
ging with works councils to ‘ﬁght for their plants’.
Hence, diﬀerential degrees of local management autonomy aﬀect how industrial
relations practices and policies are developed within MNCs. This is because macro-
institutional forces may be variably used by local actors at subsidiary level to shape
industrial relations policy and practice within MNCs. This further denotes the need
to attribute particular relevance to the level of discretion local MNC actors have in
shaping particular employment practices and identify the main factors explaining
it, and examine how they interact within MNCs.
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The INTREPID contribution
As noted earlier, INTREPID comprises a network of international scholars
involved in parallel large scale surveys of employment practice in MNCs in diﬀer-
ent national contexts. The principal objective is to ensure an accurate, representa-
tive depiction of the activities of MNCs, especially in the areas of employment
practice and industrial relations. The data collected are the outcome of the most
representative comparative surveys of employment practice in MNCs located in the
respective countries. The lack of representativeness in previous studies of MNCs
has been noted by several observers over the years (Collinson and Rugman, 2010;
Edwards et al., 2007; McDonnell et al., 2007) with disquiet expressed regarding
sample bias. This particularly relates to concern that much of the MNC literature is
dominated by over-sampling/reliance on data from a small cohort of large, well
known (brand named) US-owned manufacturing companies, such as Intel, GE and
Microsoft (Collinson and Rugman, 2010). This may also commonly lead to the
exclusion of, or limited emphasis on, indigenous MNCs who are often major
employers in their home country (McDonnell et al., 2014). In deﬁning MNCs,
the INTREPID methodology sought to address these shortfalls by initially distin-
guishing between foreign and domestic owned MNCs and then by establishing a
size threshold as follows:
. Foreign-owned MNCs are wholly or majority foreign-owned organisations
operating in the host country with 500 or more employees worldwide and 100
or more employed in their host-country operations.
. Domestic-owned MNCs are wholly or majority home country-owned organisa-
tions with 500 or more employees worldwide and at least 100 employed abroad.
The next phase involved identifying the relevant population of MNCs in each
country. The compilation of an accurate and comprehensive listing of the popula-
tion of MNCs proved to be a particularly painstaking task requiring a detailed
review of various listings of MNCs provided by national agencies and organisa-
tions specialising in company databases. Full details on this process and our overall
methodology are outlined in Edwards et al. (2013).
The third (ﬁeldwork) phase required the completion of structured face to face
interviews with the most senior HR director or manager able to answer for all of
the operations in the relevant host country.2 Respondents were asked to report on
various aspects of organisational structure/characteristics and also on ﬁve aspects
of employment practice – the HR function, pay and performance management,
employee representation and consultation, employee involvement and communi-
cation, and training, development and organisation learning. In investigating these
areas, information was sought on employment practice relating to three speciﬁc
groups of employees, namely the ‘largest occupational group (LOG)’, ‘managers’
and the ‘key group’ deﬁned immediately below. This approach reﬂects the idea that
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diﬀerent ‘bundles’ of employment/HR practices may be deployed among diﬀerent
categories of employees (Lepak and Snell, 1999).
. LOG: the largest non-managerial occupational group among the employees in
the MNCs’ operations in each country. For example, in a manufacturing busi-
ness it might be semi-skilled operators or in an insurance company it might be
call centre staﬀ.
. Managers: employees who primarily manage the organisation or a department,
subdivision, function or component of the organisation and whose main tasks
consist of the direction and coordination of the functioning of the organisation.
In other words, managers are those above the level of ﬁrst-line supervision.
. Key group: those employees whom MNCs might identify as critical to the ﬁrm’s
organisational learning and core competence. These might be research staﬀ,
product designers, major account handlers, developers of new markets, etc.
Surveys were completed in the ‘ﬁrst wave’ countries (Canada, Ireland, Spain and
the UK) between 2006 and 2008. These are seen as the most representative and
comprehensive investigations of employment practices in MNCs in their respective
countries (Edwards et al., 2013). Equivalent surveys in the ‘second wave’ countries
(Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Mexico and Norway) were undertaken
between 2010 and 2013. The INTREPID project thus provides a unique and dis-
tinctive resource of original data on which to base empirical investigation of the
multifaceted dimensions surrounding multinational ﬁrms as powerful economic,
ﬁnancial and socio-political actors within the international economy.
Since completion of the ﬁrst wave country surveys, a body of published work
using INTREPID data has emerged. Not all of this has focused on industrial
relations, though much has. Arguably, the most signiﬁcant industrial relations
contribution from ﬁrst wave INTREPID data was captured in the special issue
of Industrial and Labor Relations Review entitled ‘Cross-National Perspectives on
Multinational Companies and Employment Relations’ (volume 66, number 3,
2013). In the following two sections, we review the published literature on
INTREPID data to date and its contribution to enhancing our understanding of
industrial relations in MNCs.
Employee voice and MNCs
Institutional (macro) level effects on employee voice. In line with our earlier discussion,
much of the relevant published work has placed particular emphasis on how insti-
tutional context in the country of origin informs MNC approaches to employee
voice (cf. Edwards et al., 2012; Gooderham et al., 2011; Gunnigle et al., 2009;
Lavelle, 2008; Marginson et al., 2010, 2013; Minbaeva and Navrbjerg, 2011;
Sablok et al., 2013). The use of direct and indirect employee voice along with
the incidence of hybrid or dualistic systems has been investigated through
an approach that uses, and seeks to go beyond, the ‘varieties of capitalism’
8 Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
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(VoC) lens (Lamare et al., 2013). To some extent, the evidence has corroborated
some expectations that a VoC approach generates, such as the ingrained tendency
of US MNCs for union avoidance and the use of direct mechanisms of employee
voice in their Canadian, British and Irish subsidiaries. Similar ﬁndings were stat-
istically supported by Lavelle et al. (2010) in their study of employee voice in
MNCs with operations in Ireland. Lamare et al. (2013: 713), in exploring variations
among MNCs based in Canada, Ireland and the United Kingdom, note that
‘within LME host environments, US subsidiaries diﬀer in terms of trade union
status when compared against those from other home countries, particularly,
CMEs’. They found that union presence in German, Nordic, British and other
European-owned MNCs operating in the three LME nations studied was higher
than the levels of unionisation in US MNCs.
However, some of the expectations generated by a VoC approach were not
supported. For instance, Nordic and Japanese-owned MNCs, despite their origins
in quite diﬀerent forms of capitalism, were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from their US
counterparts (Lamare et al., 2013; Marginson et al., 2010). Moreover, double-
breasting, deﬁned as the simultaneous operation of unionised and non-unionised
sites (Gunnigle et al., 2009), was found to be especially characteristic of Nordic and
US-owned MNC subsidiaries despite the marked diﬀerences in the institutions of
the countries of origin (Lamare et al., 2013). One interpretation of these ﬁndings is
that they suggest that MNCs may be implementing employee voice arrangements
similar to the ‘dominant’ group of US ﬁrms (Ferner and Varul, 1999). The idea that
‘dominance’ eﬀects are evident in MNCs’ approaches to employee voice appears to
be particularly strong in countries that are heavily reliant on foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) inﬂows. Lamare et al. (2013) highlight the particular case of US
MNCs in Ireland, which account for over 60% of FDI. In line with this, high
levels of union avoidance were reported among MNCs operating in Ireland due
largely to the disproportionate number of US MNCs there but also possibly accen-
tuated by Ireland’s comparatively permissive industrial relations system. Union
avoidance was especially evident in new sites opened by MNC subsidiaries
(Lamare et al., 2013; Marginson et al., 2010). These scholars note that union
avoidance in US MNCs does not only imply a growing presence of direct employee
voice but also an increase of non-union employee representation structures such as
work councils or consultative committees.
Organisational (micro) effects on employee voice. A longstanding focus on institutional
context has traditionally characterised the literature on employee voice in MNC
subsidiaries with the consequence that scholars have often relegated micro-level
eﬀects to the background. Often treated as control variables, the relevance of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc characteristics is now gaining ground in explaining variation in industrial
relations (Bechter et al., 2012; Marginson et al., 2010), and employee voice in
particular (Edwards et al., 2012; Lamare et al., 2013; Lavelle et al., 2010;
Marginson et al., 2010). INTREPID scholars have been to the fore in moving
beyond analyses of the impact of institutional factors, and thus shedding light
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on other explanatory factors that may hold greater power in explaining diﬀering
approaches to employee voice in MNCs.
First, there seems to be a growing consensus on the inﬂuence of sector of
operations. In this regard, MNCs in the manufacturing sector were more likely
to adopt indirect voice approaches and were generally characterised by compara-
tively high levels of unionisation (Lamare et al., 2013; Marginson et al., 2010). In
contrast, MNCs in the service sector were more likely to present hybrid or dual-
istic approaches combining direct and indirect employee voice methods. Digging
more deeply, MNCs operating in ﬁnancial/professional services, retail, wholesale,
distribution and hospitality appear more likely to adopt minimalistic approaches
to employee voice, i.e. adopt none or very few employee voice channels.
However, where some form of employee voice is adopted by MNCs in these
sectors, hybrid or dualistic approaches appear most common (Lavelle et al.,
2010). Second, product diversiﬁcation appears to be signiﬁcant in explaining dif-
ferent approaches to employee voice, particularly in regard to double-breasting.
MNCs characterised by a high level of product diversiﬁcation are more likely to
report union avoidance via double-breasting than MNCs with a more standar-
dised product portfolio (Lamare et al., 2013). Lamare et al. (2013) show that
double-breasting approaches are more common among diversiﬁed MNCs than
among those with a single product. The interpretation here seems to infer that
since product diversiﬁcation entails a variety of production lines, and thus dif-
ferent employee groupings in each product line, this in turn results in the adop-
tion of diﬀerent employee voice approaches within such MNCs as management
deal with each group diﬀerently according to their employment characteristics
and union status. Third, MNCs that had recently acquired ‘brownﬁeld’ sites,
were more likely to combine hybrid approaches than MNCs which had opened
greenﬁeld sites or had not recently engaged in new investments (Gunnigle et al.,
2009; Marginson et al., 2010).
Subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations
As we have seen above, scholarly inquiry on the latitude of subsidiary level man-
agement to articulate and develop their own employment practices is important for
two primary reasons. First, exploration of subsidiary autonomy in industrial rela-
tions is a road comparatively less travelled (Collings, 2008). As Belizo´n et al.
(2014: 6) note: ‘despite the extensive literature examining subsidiary autonomy
over a broad range of HR practices, there has been far less research with a speciﬁc
focus on industrial relations matters’. Second, the extent of subsidiary autonomy
over industrial relations is likely to be particularly sensitive to local institutional
arrangements, probably more so than other employment practices such as perform-
ance management or training and development (Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994).
This makes comparative analysis across diﬀerent national contexts particularly
interesting. This gap in knowledge concerning variation in subsidiary autonomy
has been identiﬁed by INTREPID scholars at a macro- and micro-level of analysis.
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Institutional (macro) factors shaping subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations. Drawing
from past contributions on subsidiary autonomy over HRM practices, there
appears to be a well-established pattern in US MNCs. Such ﬁrms normally allow
limited scope for local managers in regard to HR practices (Almond and Ferner,
2006; Almond et al., 2005). In the industrial relations sphere, recent work using
INTREPID data found that US MNCs aﬀord subsidiaries located in Canada,
Ireland, Spain and the UK lower levels of autonomy when compared to their
European and Asian counterparts (Be´langer et al., 2013; Belizo´n et al., 2014;
Ferner et al., 2011, 2013). Equally, host country eﬀects remain an important
factor in attempts to reveal how macro-settings in the country of operation
impact on subsidiary autonomy in industrial relations (Almond and Ferner,
2006). MNC subsidiaries operating in more highly regulated labour market regimes
such as Mediterranean countries (e.g. Spain) report higher levels of subsidiary
autonomy than subsidiaries operating in more permissive regimes such as the
UK, Ireland and Canada, where wider institutional leeway is granted to MNCs
(Be´langer et al., 2013; Belizo´n et al., 2014; Ferner et al., 2011). Within more highly
regulated regimes, this is normally attributed to the necessity to conform to speciﬁc
local regulation and legal requirements (Marginson et al., 2010) while in more
permissive systems MNCs can exercise greater strategic freedom to adopt practices
originating in the country of origin or which are considered to be ‘best practice’
internationally (Belizo´n et al., 2014; Gunnigle et al., 2009). These ﬁndings are more
or less in line with what one would expect, but the INTREPID contribution has not
only been to demonstrate these patterns but also to show how they are mediated by
organisational level factors.
Organisational (micro) factors shaping subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations. Much of
the research eﬀort of INTREPID scholars has focused on the impact of organisa-
tional factors over subsidiary autonomy in industrial relations. At this micro-level,
substantial contributions have been made on two fronts: subsidiary characteristics
and the deployment of international HR/IR structures.
Regarding subsidiary characteristics, we earlier noted how sector of operations
constitutes a valuable explanatory factor in accounting for variation in manage-
ment approaches to employee voice. First, we ﬁnd that manufacturing MNCs are
more likely to aﬀord higher levels of autonomy (Belizo´n et al., 2014; Ferner et al.,
2011). This is most likely related to the higher levels of unionisation in manufac-
turing and the related predisposition of such MNCs to rely on indirect employee
voice approaches (Lamare et al., 2013). Second, mode of entry appears to impact
on MNCs’ capacity to implement managerial practices originated in the country of
origin. MNCs that launch new operations through greenﬁeld sites are unlikely to
encounter pre-established workforce management traditions that might character-
ise brownﬁeld sites (i.e. operations established via mergers or acquisitions).
Consequently, entry through greenﬁeld operations greatly enhance managerial cap-
acity to follow corporate preference in industrial relations. Accordingly,
INTREPID scholars have identiﬁed a pronounced tendency towards union
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avoidance in subsidiaries established at greenﬁeld sites (Gunnigle et al., 2009).
Third, a similar tendency was identiﬁed regarding the trajectory of new investments
in the country of operation. INTREPID data provide evidence to suggest that
establishment of new sites is signiﬁcantly associated with lower levels of subsidiary
autonomy over industrial relations practices (Belizo´n et al., 2014; Gunnigle et al.,
2009). Arguably, the rationale behind this relationship may spring from the fact
that new investments are generally undertaken under corporate guidelines and
ﬁnancial support, and thus are more exposed to central control (Tempel et al.,
2006). Fourth, the extent of product or service diversiﬁcation also has practical
consequences for subsidiary autonomy. It seems that the greater the extent of
diversiﬁcation, the greater the level of subsidiary autonomy (Ferner et al., 2011).
As argued in relation to employee voice above, diversiﬁcation of products or ser-
vices generally entails a more heterogeneous workforce (e.g. every product line
could be served by a diﬀerent proﬁle of employee such as skilled, unskilled, etc.)
which carries the need for MNCs to conform to both local regulatory requirements
and the diﬀering demands from diﬀerent groups of employees. Diversiﬁed MNCs
report, therefore, higher levels of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations,
arguably granted to allow local managers scope to deal with the needs of diﬀerent
groups of employees (Ferner et al., 2011; Pulignano et al., 2013).
A further micro-level factor that appears to be crucial in explaining variation in
subsidiary autonomy is subsidiary capabilities. As Be´langer et al. (2013) observe:
‘organizational capabilities are seen to be a key pillar for subsidiaries to gain space
for decision-making within the MNC’. The inﬂuence of the power interplays
between subsidiaries and headquarters (HQ) at a micro-level has been generally
neglected in previous work, and consequently, studies of the eﬀect of subsidiary
capabilities on the level of subsidiary autonomy over industrial relations constitute
an important step forward in attempts to move beyond institutions in explaining
variation in industrial relations in MNCs. Prominent scholars posit that subsidi-
aries do not necessarily occupy weak and vulnerable positions but rather may
garner power in their dealings with HQ (Ferner et al., 2012). Be´langer et al.
(2013) identify two diﬀerent subsidiary capabilities that account for variation in
the level of subsidiary autonomy, namely, internal management capabilities and the
extent of embeddedness of MNC subsidiaries in the local economy. The former
reﬂects the ability of local managers to develop positive relationships with the employees
to foster innovation and to represent favourably the subsidiary within the broader struc-
tures of the ﬁrm. Such social resources are likely to promote investment in the subsidiary
and secure more strategic mandates from headquarters (Be´langer et al., 2013: 325).
This work establishes a positive correlation between the strength of these sub-
sidiary capabilities and higher levels of subsidiary autonomy in industrial relations.
They also found that where MNCs were strongly embedded in the local economy,
then subsidiaries are more likely to enjoy greater autonomy. Subsidiary embedded-
ness within the local economy was measured through the extent subsidiaries engage
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with their local institutional arena by establishing alliances with, for example,
universities to undertake relevant research or by using diﬀerent public services
such as funding for new investments oﬀered by local entities (Murray et al.,
2014). Thus, the ability of actors at subsidiary level to generate competencies
from their immediate context outside the ﬁrm shapes their relations with managers
at higher levels within the ﬁrm.
Also within the micro-sphere, INTREPID researchers have investigated the
impact of international HR/IR structures on subsidiary autonomy (Belizo´n
et al., 2014; Ferner et al., 2011). While personal control exercised by expatriates
from headquarters or third countries is related to low levels of subsidiary auton-
omy over industrial relations (Belizo´n et al., 2014), the deployment of various
international HR structures seems to have no discernible impact on the extent of
autonomy enjoyed by local managers in MNCs (Belizo´n et al., 2014; Ferner et al.,
2011). In practical terms, this means that variations in the level of subsidiary
autonomy in industrial relations appear detached from the use of international
HR structures, such as the presence of an international committee acting as a
policy-making body to develop and disseminate HRM practice across borders,
the use of human resources information systems (HRIS), the incidence of direct
and regular reporting from subsidiary to HQ on HR/IR issues and the use of a
shared service centre for HR. These international structures have proven to limit
the level of subsidiary autonomy over other HR practices (Belizo´n et al., 2013;
Ferner et al., 2011). However, IR practices seem to follow their own path. Thus,
Ferner et al. (2011) argue that industrial relations practices, because of their local
nature, are not as dependent on corporate strategies and structures as other areas
of HR practice.
Charting a future research agenda
As illustrated above, considerable insights have been gleaned on the autonomy
enjoyed by subsidiary level management in MNCs in their interaction with local
unions and systems of collective representation. The factors shaping subsidiary
autonomy at both institutional (macro) and organisational micro-level have been
widely identiﬁed by the INTREPID network. Yet much remains to be done, not
least the need for more extensive and comparative analyses of the power interplays
or interaction between institutional- (home and host country eﬀects) and ﬁrm-level
organisational and structural factors impacting subsidiary level autonomy.
Of particular interest is how organisational (micro) level features mediate the
extent of subsidiary level management discretion over employee representative
engagement within MNCs. We have seen above reference to initial INTREPID
work in this sphere. There is clearly room for some replication using the broader
spectrum of ‘wave two’ countries which also provide scope for a regional focus. For
example, it should be possible to compare these eﬀects and measure their relative
inﬂuence in MNC subsidiaries in the six European countries involved, namely,
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Norway, Spain and the UK. In so doing, scholars
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might assess the eﬀects of the above factors (independent variables) on trade union
status and engagement. This would help advance understanding on how a wide
range of factors inﬂuence both employee representation status and the extent of
management discretion over collective representation.
As noted earlier, diﬀerent types of MNCs operate in diﬀerent institutional con-
texts and one way of categorising them is by country of origin. Again the addition
of second wave countries provides the potential to explore variation amongst and
within CME and LME market economies as identiﬁed by the VoC approach (Hall
and Soskice, 2001). The Nordic countries, categorised as CMEs, and exempliﬁed
by Denmark and Norway in INTREPID, are arguably diﬀerent from Germany,
for instance, where the industrial relations system has a stronger legislative basis.
Even within Nordic countries there may be diﬀerences between employment
regimes, e.g. Denmark’s use of more liberal approaches such as of ‘ﬂexicurity’
(Gooderham et al., 2011; see also Gooderham et al., 2014 in current issue).
Future research could further proﬁle the impact of sub-national governance
systems, such as geographical regions (e.g. federal states), which often split jur-
isdiction over industrial relations issues, thus potentially inducing within-country
variations in labour market regulation. In this regard, INTREPID now incorp-
orates ‘second wave’ countries with a federal structure such as Belgium. Recent
work in this area has highlighted the importance of the sub-national level in
shaping management practices within MNCs (cf. Almond, 2011). However,
most studies are qualitative and lack the capacity to assess the degree of variation
(if any) on a sub-national level. Furthermore, a focus on within and across coun-
try variation will allow scholars to assess the extent to which factors that inﬂu-
ence employee representation and local management discretion diﬀer across
diverse industrial relations systems. This is particularly relevant in the light of
Hyman’s (2009: 10) observation regarding the inadequate way in which scholars
have responded so far to the dilemma of comparative research. As we have seen,
comparative analysis in industrial relations is fraught with diﬃculty since national
business and industrial relations systems generally diﬀer in key respects, rendering
each quite contextually bound and, in many respects, unique (cf. Crouch, 2005;
Edwards et al., 2013). As Hyman (2009: 9–10) argues, reducing complexity and
variety by elaborating diﬀerent typologies or models and thereby engaging in
‘typiﬁcation’ carries the disadvantage of reducing: ‘. . . diversity to a limited
number of ‘models’ or ideal types and (supressing the) . . .more complex aspects
of diﬀerentiation’. He also concedes that while this approach has the potential to
eﬀectively illustrate how economies can be shaped and operate according to dif-
ferent institutional logics, it also risks ‘over-simpliﬁcation’ by identifying ideal-
typical country groupings based on particular characteristics, which may be
shared to a diﬀerential degree by countries so categorised. This may prove a
fruitful avenue for INTREPID scholars. In particular, because multiple determin-
ants are at work, researchers interested in understanding the dynamics aﬀecting
the development of industrial relations practices within MNCs need to move
away from over simpliﬁcation of national economy types and embrace the
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complex interface of power interplay between macro-institutional and micro-orga-
nisational eﬀects within MNCs.
Two particular lines of inquiry deal with diﬀerent dimensions of context. First is
the impact of sector, discussed above. Here INTREPID scholars might take up the
challenge identiﬁed by Bechter et al. (2012: 185) that ‘industrial relations vary
across sectors as deeply as they do across countries’. This might be achieved by
more in-depth analysis of sector and sub-sector variation. Earlier, we noted diﬀer-
ences between manufacturing and service sector MNCs. However, this is arguably
too crude a level of analysis and more speciﬁc sectoral categorisations such as
European industrial activity classiﬁcation (NACE codes) might be used in future
work. This may need to be done on a comparative (cross-country) basis to garner
adequate numbers of MNCs in each sectoral cell. A second important but some-
what problematic focus of future inquiry is the impact of the global ﬁnancial crisis
(GFC) on MNCs and industrial relations therein. A key challenge relates to vari-
ation in the timing of surveys. In the ‘ﬁrst wave’ countries, surveys were undertaken
between 2006 and 2008 while this work was undertaken in ‘second wave’ countries
much later, mostly in the period 2010–2013. This is not unusual in comparative
research of this nature (Edwards et al., 2013), especially in surveys such as
INTREPID which address phenomena that do not change quickly. Work to
date on the impact of the GFC has been largely qualitative in nature (cf.
Gunnigle et al., 2013) and generally lacking in comparative focus, thus providing
at least the possibility for greater quantitative analyses as might be undertaken
using INTREPID data.
Of course, the INTREPID data and scholarship thereon are not without limi-
tations, as alluded to above.3 While this work facilitates advanced analysis of
practice and behaviour in MNCs in diﬀering contexts, it cannot shed substantive
light on issues of process, eﬀectively, the means by which MNCs deploy certain
practices and their underlying motives. Case study based methodologies remain the
favoured way of investigating such phenomena. Equally this work captures prac-
tice at a particular point in time and is therefore unable to provide a longitudinal
perspective which might chart the development and evolution of employment prac-
tice in MNCs. The project also largely relies on survey data from developed econo-
mies and it would be beneﬁcial if, in future, we might witness greater participation
from emerging economies.
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Notes
1. INTREPID comprises a network of international scholars involved in parallel surveys of
employment practices in multinational companies (MNCs) across different national con-
texts. These surveys were initially conducted in Canada, Ireland, Spain and the UK and
were the most representative investigations of their kind in these countries. Subsequent
surveys were conducted in ‘second wave’ countries, namely Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Denmark, Mexico and Norway. For a detailed overview of the methodology
employed see Edwards et al. (2013), and for additional information on each country see
Novick et al. (2011) on Argentina; McDonnell et al. (2011) on Australia; Minbaeva and
Navrbjerg (2011) on Denmark; McDonnell et al. (2007) and Lavelle et al. (2009) on
Ireland; Carrillo and Gomis (2014) on Mexico; Quintanilla et al. (2010) on Spain;
Steen (2010) on Norway and Edwards et al. (2007) on the UK. Data collection in
Belgium is near completion.
2. Face to face interviews were not conducted in Canada, Denmark and Norway where
respondents were required to complete the questionnaire in either hard copy or on-line.
This was supplemented by a small number of qualitative interviews (cf. Edwards et al.
2013 and relevant country reports).
3. Greater detail on the methodology employed and limitations thereof is provided in a
Special Issue of Industrial and Labor Relations Review based on the INTREPID project
published in Spring 2013 (volume 66, number 3) and entitled ‘Cross-National
Perspectives on Multinational Companies and Employment Relations’.
References
Almond F and Ferner A (2006) American Multinationals in Europe: Managing Employment
Relations Across National Borders. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Almond P (2011) The sub-national embeddedness of international HRM. Human Relations
64(4): 531–551.
Almond P, Edwards T, Colling T, et al. (2005) Unravelling home and host country effects,
an investigation of the HR policies of an American multinational in four European
countries. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society 44(2): 276–307.
Arrowsmith J and Marginson P (2006) The European cross-border dimension to collective
bargaining in multi-national companies. European Journal of Industrial Relations 12(3):
245–266.
16 Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
 at University of Limerick on February 18, 2015jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
XML Template (2015) [16.2.2015–12:43pm] [1–20]
//blrnas3.glyph.com/cenpro/ApplicationFiles/Journals/SAGE/3B2/JIRJ/Vol00000/140032/APPFile/SG-
JIRJ140032.3d (JIR) [PREPRINTER stage]
Bechter B, Brandl B and Meardi G (2012) Sector or countries? Typologies and levels of
analysis in comparative industrial relations. European Journal of Industrial Relations
18(3): 185–202.
Be´langer J, Levesque C, Jalette P, et al. (2013) Discretion in employment relations policy
among foreign-controlled multinationals in Canada. Human Relations 66(3): 307–332.
Belizo´n MJ, Gunnigle P and Morley M (2013) Determinants of central control and subsid-
iary autonomy in HRM: The case of foreign-owned multinational companies in Spain.
Human Resource Management Journal 23(3): 262–278.
Belizo´n MJ, Gunnigle P, Morley M, et al. (2014) Subsidiary autonomy over industrial
relations in Ireland and Spain. European Journal of Industrial Relations. DOI: 10.1177/
0959680113517199.
Boxall P and Purcell J (2003) Strategy and Human Resource Management. London: Palgrave.
Carrillo J and Gomis R (2014) Las Multinacionales En Dato: Empleo, Recursos Humanos E
Innovacio´n. Tijuana: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (in press).
Collings DG (2008) Multinational corporations and industrial relations research: A road less
travelled. International Journal of Management Reviews 10(2): 173–193.
Collinson S and Rugman A (2010) Case selection biases in management research: The
implications for international business studies. European Journal of International
Management 4(5): 441–463.
Crouch C (2005) Capitalist Diversity and Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Edwards P, Edwards T, Ferner A, et al. (2007) Employment practices of MNCs in organ-
isational context: A large-scale survey. Report of the main survey. Available at: http://
www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/projects/mncemployment/conference_papers/full_
report_july.pdf (accessed 2 December 2014).
Edwards T, Jalette P and Tregaskis O (2012) To what extent is there a regional logic in the
management of labour in multinational companies? International Journal of Human
Resource Management 23(12): 2468–2490.
Edwards T, Marginson P and Ferner A (2013) Multinational companies in cross-national
context: Integration, differentiation, and the interactions between MNCs and nation
states. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 66(3): 547–587.
Ferner A, Almond P and Colling T (2005) Institutional theory and the cross-national trans-
fer of employment policy: The case of ‘workforce diversity’ in US multinationals. Journal
of International Business Studies 36(3): 304–321.
Ferner A and Quintanilla J (1998) Multinationals, national systems and HRM: The endur-
ing influence of national identity or a process of ‘Anglo-Saxonization’? International
Journal of Human Resource Management 9(4): 710–731.
Ferner A, Tregaskis O, Edwards P, et al. (2011) HRM structures and subsidiary discretion in
foreign multinationals in the UK. International Journal of Human Resource Management
22(3): 483–509.
Ferner A and Varul MZ (1999) The German Way: German MNCs and Human Resource
Management. London: Anglo-German Foundation.
Ferner AM, Edwards T and Tempel A (2012) Power, institutions and the cross-national
transfer of employment practices in multinationals. Human Relations 65(2): 163–187.
Freeman RB and Medoff JL (1984) What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books.
Geary J and Roche WK (2001) Multinationals and human resource practices in Ireland: A
rejection of the ‘‘new conformance thesis’’. International Journal of Human Resource
Management 12(1): 109–127.
Gunnigle et al. 17
 at University of Limerick on February 18, 2015jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
XML Template (2015) [16.2.2015–12:43pm] [1–20]
//blrnas3.glyph.com/cenpro/ApplicationFiles/Journals/SAGE/3B2/JIRJ/Vol00000/140032/APPFile/SG-
JIRJ140032.3d (JIR) [PREPRINTER stage]
Gooderham P, Navrbjerg SE, Olsen KM, et al. (2011) Arbeidslivsregimer i Danmark og
Norge – ga˚r de hver sin vei? (Employment regimes in Denmark and Norway: A parting of
the ways?). Tidsskrift for Arbejdsliv 13(3): 30–44.
Gooderham P, Navrbjerg SE, Olsen KM, et al. (2014) The labor market regimes of
Denmark and Norway – One Nordic model? Journal of Industrial Relations. DOI:
10.1177/0022185614534103.
Gunnigle P (1995) Collectivism and the management of industrial relations in greenfield
sites. Human Resource Management Journal 5(3): 24–40.
Gunnigle P, Collings D and Morley M (2005) Exploring the dynamics of industrial relations
in US multinationals: Evidence from the Republic of Ireland. Industrial Relations Journal
36(3): 241–256.
Gunnigle P, Lavelle J and McDonnell A (2009) Subtle but deadly? Union avoidance through
‘double breasting’ among multinational companies. Advances in Industrial and Labor
Relations 16: 51–74.
Gunnigle P, Lavelle J and Monaghan S (2013) Weathering the storm? Multinational com-
panies and human resource management through the global financial crisis. International
Journal of Manpower 34(3): 214–231.
Hall PA and Soskice D (eds) (2001) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of
Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hyman R (2009) How can we study industrial relations comparatively? Bulletin of
Comparative Labour Relations 70: 3–23.
Jacoby SM (1997) Modern Manors. Welfare Capitalism Since the New Deal. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Lamare R, Gunnigle P, Marginson P, et al. (2013) Union status and double-breasting at
multinational companies in three liberal market economies. Industrial and Labor
Relations Review 66(3): 696–722.
Lavelle J (2008) Charting the contours of union recognition in foreign-owned MNCs: Survey
evidence from the Republic of Ireland. Irish Journal of Management 29(1): 45–63.
Lavelle J, Gunnigle P and McDonnell A (2010) Patterning employee voice in multinational
companies. Human Relations 63(3): 395–418.
Lepak D and Snell S (1999) The human resource architecture: Towards a theory of human
capital allocation and development. Academy of Management Review 24(1): 31–48.
McDonnell A, Lavelle J and Gunnigle P (2014) Human resource management in multi-
national enterprises: Evidence from a late industrialising economy. Management
International Review. DOI: 10.1007/s11575-014-0202-y.
McDonnell A, Lavelle J, Gunnigle P, et al. (2007) Management research on multinational
corporations: A methodological critique. Economic and Social Review 38(2): 235–258.
McDonnell A, Russell H, Sablok G, et al. (2011) Report: A profile of human resource
management in multinational enterprises operating in Australia. Available from:http://
ahri.clients.squiz.net/resources/reports-and-white-papers/?a¼7575 (accessed 2 December
2014).
Marginson P, Edwards P, Edwards T, et al. (2010) Employee representation and consulta-
tive voice in multinational companies operating in Britain. British Journal of Industrial
Relations 48(1): 151–180.
Marginson P, Hall M, Hoffmann A, et al. (2004) The impact of European works councils on
management decision-making in UK- and US-based multinationals. British Journal of
Industrial Relations 40(2): 209–234.
18 Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
 at University of Limerick on February 18, 2015jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
XML Template (2015) [16.2.2015–12:43pm] [1–20]
//blrnas3.glyph.com/cenpro/ApplicationFiles/Journals/SAGE/3B2/JIRJ/Vol00000/140032/APPFile/SG-
JIRJ140032.3d (JIR) [PREPRINTER stage]
Marginson P and Meardi G (2009) Multinational Companies and Collective Bargaining.
Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.
Marginson P, Lavelle J, Quintanilla J, et al. (2013) Variation in approaches to European
works councils in multinational companies. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 66(3):
618–644.
Meardi G, Marginson P, Fichter M, et al. (2009) Varieties of multinationals. Adapting
employment practices in Central Eastern Europe. Industrial Relations 48(3): 489–512.
Minbaeva D and Navrbjerg SE (2011) Employment practices of multinational companies in
Denmark. Result Report SMG, Copenhagen Business School and FAOS, University of
Copenhagen.
Murray G, Jalette P, Be´langer J, et al. (2014) The ‘hollowing out’ of the national subsidiary
in multinational companies: Is it happening, does it matter, what are the strategic con-
sequences? Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research. DOI: 10.1177/
1024258914525564.
Novick M, Palomino H and Gurrera MS (2011) Multinacionales en la Argentina. Buenos
Aires: Programa Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo (PNUD), Ministerio de Trabajo,
Empleo y Seguridad.
Pulignano V, Doerflinger N and De Franceschi F (2013) Flexibility and security within
European labour markets: The role of local bargaining and the varieties of ‘trade-offs’
within multinationals. In: Paper presented at 10th ILERA, Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
20–22 June 2013.
Quintanilla J, Belizo´n MJ, Sa´nchez-Mangas R, et al. (2010) Employment practices of multi-
national companies in Spain [Survey Report]. Madrid: IESE.
Rosenzweig P and Nohria N (1994) Influences on human resource management practices in
multinational corporations. Journal of International Business Studies 25(2): 229–251.
Royle T (1998) Avoidance strategies and the German system of co-determination.
International Journal of Human Resource Management 9(6): 1026–1047.
Royle T (ed.) (2000) Working for McDonald’s in Europe: The Unequal Struggle. London:
Routledge.
Royle T (2006) The dominance effect? Multinational corporations in the Italian quick-food
service sector. British Journal of Industrial Relations 44(4): 757–779.
Sablok G, Bartram T, Stanton P, et al. (2013) The impact of union presence and strategic
human resource management on employee voice in multinational enterprises in Australia.
Journal of Industrial Relations 55(4): 621–639.
Steen CR (2010) Survey av HR praksiser i multinasjonale selskaper i Norge.
Presentasjonavførsteresultater. Workshop Presentation, Solstrand, Bergen.
Taylor S, Beechler S and Napier N (1996) Toward an integrative model of strategic inter-
national human resource management. Academy of Management Review 21(4): 959–985.
Tempel A, Edwards T, Ferner A, et al. (2006) Subsidiary responses to institutional duality:
Collective representation practices of US multinationals in Britain and Germany. Human
Relations 59(11): 1543–1570.
Waddington J (2010) European Works Councils and Industrial Relations. London:
Routledge.
Whitley R (1999) Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and Change of Business
Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Whitley R (2001) How and why are international firms different? The consequences of cross-
border managerial coordination for firm characteristics and behaviour. In: Morgan G,
Gunnigle et al. 19
 at University of Limerick on February 18, 2015jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
XML Template (2015) [16.2.2015–12:43pm] [1–20]
//blrnas3.glyph.com/cenpro/ApplicationFiles/Journals/SAGE/3B2/JIRJ/Vol00000/140032/APPFile/SG-
JIRJ140032.3d (JIR) [PREPRINTER stage]
Kristensen PH and Whitley R (eds) The Multinational Firm: Organizing Across
Institutional and National Divides. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 27–68.
Williams K and Geppert M (2011) Bargained globalisation: Employment relations
providing robust ‘‘tool kits’’ for socio-political strategizing in MNCs in Germany.
In: Do¨rrenba¨cher C and Geppert M (eds) Politics and Power in the Multinational
Corporation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Biographical notes
Patrick Gunnigle is Professor of Business Studies at the University of Limerick and
Visiting Professor in Industrial Sociology at Rhodes University. His research has
been published in leading journals such the British Journal of Industrial Relations,
Industrial and Labor Relations Review and Industrial Relations (US).
Valeria Pulignano is Professor in Labour Sociology and Industrial Relations at the
Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven (Belgium) and coordinator of the Center for
Sociological Research (CESO). She has published, among others The
Transformation of Employment Relations in Europe (Routledge, 2014).
Tony Edwards is Professor in Comparative HRM at Kings College London. His
research centres on the management of workforces in multinational companies and
has been published in many of the leading journals in his ﬁeld.
Marı´a Jesu´s Belizo´n is a doctoral scholar at the Kemmy Business School,
University of Limerick, Ireland. Her research focuses on international human
resource management in multinational companies. Speciﬁcally, she has published
work on the extent and determinants of subsidiary autonomy over HRM and
industrial relations in multinational subsidiaries.
Steen E Navrbjerg is Associate Professor at the Employment Relations Research
Centre (FAOS), University of Copenhagen (Denmark). His research has been
published in journals such as The International Journal of Human Resource
Management and Economic and Industrial Democracy.
Karen M Olsen is Professor in Human Resource Management at Norwegian
School of Economics (NHH), Bergen. Her research has been published in leading
journals such as Human Resource Management (US), Work, Employment &
Society and the European Journal of Industrial Relations.
Lourdes Susaeta is Associate Professor at the University Complutense, Madrid and
Associate Researcher at IESE Business School. Her research has been published in
journals such as Industrial & Labor Relations Review and Cross Cultural
Management.
20 Journal of Industrial Relations 0(0)
 at University of Limerick on February 18, 2015jir.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
